










Four different approaches dominate the modern discussion around the topic of how 
best to define human rationality. These are the following: 1) Unbounded Rationality 
(UR); 2) Optimization under Constraints (OuC); 3) Heuristics and Biases (H&B); 4) 
Ecological Rationality (ER). Typically, proponents of approaches 3) and 4) criticize 
the models put forth by the proponents of approaches 1) and 2) for their cognitive 
unrealism. However, many ethologists contend that it makes sense to account for data 
gathered in animal behavior research along the lines of precisely these models. 
Elaborating upon this claim, Stanovich suggested that models of the kinds 1) and 2) 
are more appropriate to account for the behavior of creatures endowed with simple 
cognitive architectures rather than to account for the behavior of humans. Moreover, 
according to Stanovich’s own new approach, it is the cognitive complexity of humans 
rather than their computational limitations that makes them (partially) irrational. 
Could he be right? Following a suggestion made by Kacelnik (2006), I will contend 
that, in order to try to find out an answer to this question, one needs to realize that the 
term “rationality” in use in this debate has to be understood as referring to, at least, 
three distinct properties; and that, once one analyzes each of them properly, most of 




1. Models of Human Rationality 
 
Since the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, the philosophical, 
psychological and social-scientific debate concerning how best to define human 
rationality has been revolving around the following four main views: 1) Unbounded 
rationality (UR); 2) Optimization under constraints (OuC); 3) Heuristics and biases 
(H&B); and 4) Ecological rationality (ER).  
Let me review them briefly. 
 
 
1.1 Unbounded Rationality (UR) 
 
UR is considered to be the classical view in rationality theory. Famous holders of this 
view are, e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Arrow (1951), Friedman 
(1953), Savage (1954) or Jeffrey (1983). According to their standpoint, normal (i.e., 
rational) human action is to be viewed as some sort of empirical instantiation of a 
model of normative optimization (rational choice theory). This approach views agents 
as the holders of sets of preferences and assumes these sets to be well behaved in 
terms of a certain number of axioms of choice (e.g., completeness, transitivity, 
independence of irrelevant alternatives, sure-thing principle). It then proves that non-
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self-defeating agents, thus characterized, behave in order to maximize individual 
expected utility. 
Typically, UR models do not take into account any constraints (e.g., time 
constraints or cognitive processing limitations). This is, of course, the reason why the 
term ‘unbounded’ is used in their characterization.  
This disregard from time or procedural constraints entails two unwelcome 
consequences though. First, in many situations, in the absence of such constraints, the 
problem space remains unlimited and, therefore, a UR model cannot even be specified 
(cf. Chase et al. 1998, p. 207). Second, algorithms implementing those models that 
can be specified tend to generate unavoidable problems of computational complexity 
and intractability. 
The moral usually drawn from these consequences is twofold: first, UR models 
ought to be seen, first and foremost, as regulatory ideals; second, empirical cases of 
human decision-making and action ought to be considered to be only approximate 
instantiations to these ideals.  
 
 
1.2.Optimization under Constraints (OuC) 
 
OuC is a view trying to combine the classical approach to rationality theory with a 
concern with, at least, some of the bounds within which decisions in the real world 
have to be made. Thus, OuC theoreticians try to capture the structure of normal (i.e., 
rational) human action through the introduction of a number of constraints into the 
design of traditional models of normative optimization.  
These theoreticians admit being divided into two groups, according to the nature of 
the constraints they choose to introduce in their models. 
To the first group belong those claiming that normal human action is best viewed 
as an instantiation of a model of optimization that is subject to a number of time, cost, 
or information processing constraints (see, e.g. Stigler 1961). The holders of this view 
have developed optimization algorithms that are supposed to represent the way the 
mind takes into account variables such as, e.g., the cost of information gathering. 
According to such algorithms, search should terminate when its costs outweigh its 
benefits. 
 To the second group belong those claiming that normal human action is best 
viewed as an optimal adaptation of the agent’s behavior, given its goals, to certain 
relevant aspects of the decision environment. Their idea is to use optimization 
algorithms in order to predict human behavior from the structure of the environment 
rather than from the structure of the mind. This is the view usually called “Rational 
Analysis” (cf. Anderson 1990, 1991).  
However, no matter the group they belong to, the algorithms put forth by OuC 
theoreticians tend to be computationally extremely complex. That is, they tend to 
suffer from the very same intractability problems – typical of UR models – that they 
were intended to overcome in the first place. As a matter of fact, J. R. Anderson 
himself could not help confessing that (Anderson 1991, p. 474):  
 
The major complication in this step is analytic tractability.  
 
 
1.3. Heuristics & Biases (H&B) 
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Proponents of the H&B approach start from the claim, originally made by Herbert 
Simon (1969), that the human mind is inescapably bounded; as a consequence, they 
suggest that normal human action is determined mainly by non-rational heuristics and 
biases the human cognitive apparatus is stuck with in the course of the evolutionary 
process. These heuristics and biases, frequently called “quick and dirty”, are to be 
seen as simple cognitive shortcuts that direct us in our ways of acting; moreover, they 
are supposed to be independent from experience and very hard to overcome by 
learning. One way of conceiving of them is as cognitive analogs of the visual illusions 
studied in the psychology of perception (such as the famous Müller-Lyer illusion). 
Holders of this view are, inter alia, Tversky (1969, 1974, 1975, 1981), Kahneman 
(1982, 2011), Piatelli-Palmarini (1994) or Lichtenstein and Slovic (2006). 
Thus, according to these researchers, the “ways of man” contradict, to a large 
extent, the prescriptions of classical rational choice theory. Man should therefore be 
considered to be a non-rational creature (partially, at least). The job of rationality 
theorists, in turn, should be to strive to identify these heuristics and biases and to 
suggest methods for helping people becoming aware of their own irrationality and 
correct it.  
This approach has in the meantime evolved into a dualistic model of reasoning and 
action, according to which the human cognitive apparatus should be seen as being 
endowed with two systems of reasoning rather than one. One of these systems 
(System 1) is supposed to be fast and to include a large stock of non-rational quick 
and dirty heuristics; the other system (System 2) is supposed to comprise an important 
set of normatively rational inferential procedures, to be slow and to exist in close 
association with language and consciousness (cp. e.g. Sloman 1996, Kahneman 
2011). People are supposed to act in agreement with System 1 when they are not 
acting reflectively; under circumstances in which careful reflection is possible, 
System 2 steers action. There are many cases, however, in which both systems get 
mobilized and compete for dominance. 
 
 
1.4. Ecological Rationality (ER) 
 
Also elaborating upon H. Simon’s original approach, ER is the view according to 
which rationality is to be equated with adaptability.  
Similarly to H&B theoreticians, ER supporters accept the idea that the human 
mind is inescapably bounded. Thus, they agree with H&B theoreticians that normal 
human action is frequently the outcome of the triggering of non-normative heuristics. 
But they contend that the H&B research program has failed to find and properly 
identify any of them.  
Rather than “quick and dirty”, ER theoreticians prefer to call the heuristics they 
claim the human mind is genuinely equipped with “fast and frugal”. This replacement 
of the negative term ‘dirty’ with the more positive term ‘frugal’ is, obviously, not 
merely terminological. As a matter of fact, ER researchers accuse H&B theorists of 
having neglected one of the two key aspects of H. Simon’s original approach. This is 
the aspect that human rationality, besides being bounded, is also ‘situated’. What 
Simon meant by the use of this term was the idea that human rational behavior needs 
to be understood by reference to the environment within which it is supposed to be 
deployed. ER theorists think this aspect of Simon’s original thinking needs to be 
strongly emphasized. 
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Thus, dissimilarly to H&B theoreticians, ER proponents state that, within its 
proper environment, and under the right sort of circumstances, the display of any of 
the heuristics they study admits being seen as a more robust way of dealing with an 
uncertain and complicated world than highly complex optimization tools. This means 
that, according to their standpoint, resorting to a fast and frugal heuristics might 
frequently be the rational (i.e., adaptive) way to go. 




2. The Debate 
 
2.1. Round 1 
 
Proponents of the H&B or ER views typically criticize UR or OuC models for being 
descriptively inadequate at the behavioral level and highly unrealistic at the cognitive 
level. More particularly, they put forth the objections (A) and (B) below. 
Objection (A): The axioms (e.g., transitivity or independence) from which 
normative models of rational behavior have been derived have been shown by 
experimental economists and cognitive psychologists not to be true of concrete human 
subjects in multiple situations (cf., e.g., Allais 1953, Tversky 1969, 1975).  
Objection (B): The complexity involved in the implementation of these models 
outside of simplified toy worlds is staggering; therefore, when matters are considered 
from an evolutionary perspective, the cognitive processing of such a complexity 
would be too costly and largely inefficient.  
Objection (B) is, of course, just a rewording, wrapped up in evolutionary 
considerations, of the two unwelcome consequences of rational choice theory already 
diagnosed in section 1.1. 
Supporters of the H&B or ER standpoints thus contend that expecting real people 
to routinely conform to such norms, even if only approximately, requires not only 
disregarding important results in Cognitive Psychology, but also assuming that their 
minds contain a kind of superdupercomputer similar to the one needed to equip the 
mind of a Laplacean demon. This is, of course, unacceptable. Thus, models based on 
such expectations and assumptions should be viewed as describing the would-be 
cognitive and behavioral capabilities of god-like creatures and not those of real world 
biological creatures, such as humans. 
 
 
2.2. Round 2 
 
In general, UR or OuC supporters respond to these criticisms along the same lines that 
were famously put forth by Friedman (1953) more than sixty years ago. These are the 
following:  
Reply to Objection (A): The sort of criticism instantiated by this objection falls 
prey to a basic logical fallacy, namely, the fallacy of the negation of the antecedent. 
This reply has a Popperian flavor: it implies that theories are to be assessed by the 
success of their predictions only. From this perspective, empirically driven axiom 
testing is basically pointless (cf. also Davidson 1980, 1995).  
Reply to Objection (B): The sort of criticism instantiated by this objection fails to 
see that the assumptions backing up the use of the axioms of rational choice as the 
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foundation for a theory of human action are actually biologically sound. These 
assumptions are the following. First, both cognition and behavior are adaptive; 
second, what adaptation amounts to is optimization. Criticisms based on unproven 
allegations regarding the details of cognitive implementation (about which nobody 
knows much, really) are therefore both misplaced as well as theoretically detrimental. 
These criticisms forget that evolution writes straight with crooked lines. Once again, 
J. R. Anderson put the point nicely (cf. Anderson 1991, p. 483):  
 
It is in the spirit of a rational analysis to prescribe what the behavior of a system 
should be rather than how to compute it. 
 
 
2.3. Round 3 
 
Obviously, the dialectic does not stop here. ER theoreticians, for instance, claim that 
what they are looking for is an integration of the question of why it is that humans 
behave in the way they do with the question of how it is that they manage to do what 
they do. Their ambition is therefore meant to be explanatory in a deeper sense, 
namely, in the sense in which an explanation of a natural phenomenon should provide 
us with some understanding of the underlying causal mechanisms producing it and 
not only with the ability for making successful predictions. Seeing things from this 
perspective, computational tractability and feasibility seem to be unavoidable 
boundaries for the cognitive implications (the crooked lines) of a behavioral theory. 
Another researcher supporting this line of inquiry is, e.g., Jonathan St. Evans, 
according to whom the only real explanatory question involving human cognition is 
the question of determining what are the mechanisms that our phenotypes have 
developed in order to reach cognition’s goals (Evans 1991 p. 493).  
Deeper explanations should also have better predictive value though (that is, they 
should write straight too). Thus, ER theorists devised various cognitive experiments 
aimed at showing that the outcome of the deployment under the appropriate 
circumstances of the fast and frugal heuristics they claim to have identified match 
human behavioral facts better than the predictions made in agreement with UR, OuC 
or H&B standpoints.  
However, the right interpretation of these experiments is a matter of controversy; 
and, on the other hand, at least some OuC theorists contend that, in this context, the 
claim that alleged mechanistic explanations are, in any meaningful sense, deeper is 
purely arbitrary (cf. Anderson 1991, p. 512). It is not my purpose to lead this 
discussion into a general discussion around the nature of psychological explanation 
though; so let me close this section here. 
 
  
3. Unexpected Findings and a Possible “Third Way” 
 
More recently, Stanovich (2013) suggested a fifth view in rationality theory. I will 
call it “Brute Rationality” (BR) for reasons that will become apparent below. BR puts 
together elements of the earlier views and combines them in a new direction. This 
new direction was, in turn, suggested to Stanovich by a series of earlier remarks made 
by Searle (2001), on the one hand, and by the consideration of unexpected findings he 




3.1. Ultimatum Game with Chimpanzees 
 
These unexpected findings are undoubtedly important. Thus, and leaving Searle aside, 
let me make a small detour through some of them before summarizing the essentials 
of Stanovich’s BR approach to rationality. These findings consist of several 
experimental results obtained in animal behavior research that seem to suggest that, in 
a number of circumstances, non-human animals behave rationally in situations in 
which humans do not. That is, frequently, humans seem to be less rational than other 
animals (e.g., Kagel, C. J. 1987). 
Jensen, Call and Tomasello (2007) provide us with one good example of such 
work. They were able to devise a version of the famous ultimatum game that was 
accessible to chimpanzees. They then compared the results of this version of the game 
presented to the chimpanzees with the results obtained in the human version of the 
same game by experimental economists.  
The outcome of this comparison was the following: chimpanzees always behaved 
as rational maximizers whereas humans, in general, do not. As is well known, human 
responders tend to reject low offers because, in their own words, they are “unfair”. In 
fact, most human proposers anticipate that responders will respond this way and, in 
general, end up making fair offers. Not so with chimpanzees. Proposers almost always 
made selfish offers and responders almost always accepted anything that was greater 
than nothing, in agreement with the prescriptions of rational choice theory. 
Now, when read either from the perspective defined by UR or OuC standpoints or 
from the cognitively inspired criticisms of them put forth by the proponents of the 
H&B and ER views these findings sound paradoxical. 
 
 
3.2.“Economic Animal” vs. “Irrational Man”? 
 
As mentioned above, impressed by these results, Stanovich advanced his own view – 
BR. In a sense, BR may be regarded as a sort of ‘third way’ in the rationality theory 
debate. Although it collects elements from the UR and OuC camp, on the one hand, 
and from the H&B and ER camp, on the other hand, it remains distinct from both of 
them.  
According to Stanovich’s new view, it is not god-like creatures but brutes that 
admit being best described by traditional optimization models of rationality. That is, 
being indisputably adaptive, non-human animal cognition is the proper target for 
being the subject of a Friedman-like optimization approach. Humans, on the other 
hand, fail to be rational; however, Stanovich claims that humans fail in this endeavor 
not because their cognitive make-up lacks the computational resources needed to 
implement highly complex optimization procedures but, rather, because their own 
cognitive complexity makes it harder for them to conform to the strictures of rational 
choice. 
Therefore, so the story goes, when unhindered by human mental complexity, 
natural selection shapes the decision algorithms contained in the simple brains of 
animals into those whose output is the behavior typical of “economic man”. Humans, 
in turn, seem to have been subject to strange evolutionary pressures that turned them 
into the (partly, at least) irrational animal. The latter is then a conclusion that BR 




4. Making sense 
 
A striking aspect of this dispute is that all of the above reviewed standpoints use what 
look like reasonable evolutionary considerations in order to justify what are in fact 
contradictory views on human rationality. How can we make sense of this?  
My diagnosis is the following: the different parties in the debate are implicitly 
using the term “rationality” in their arguments in more than one sense; but they seem 
not to be aware of the fact that they are doing so. Thus, the discussion gets muddled. 
In order to improve things, I will introduce an important conceptual clarification 





Kacelnik’s clarification proposal is the following: if we are going to discuss 
meaningfully whether or not non-human animals are rational, we need first to 
introduce a sharp distinction between three different concepts of rationality. These are 
discriminated below.  
First, P-rationality, or psychological rationality; this is a concept of rationality 
associated with the presence of an articulated belief-desire network. Depending on 
what theory one accepts of what the nature of this network is, P-rationality may or 
may not be associated with procedural rationality. Theoreticians working within the 
H&B or ER views are clearly making this association.  
Second, E-rationality, or economic rationality; this is a concept of rationality 
associated with behavioral consistency, revealed preferences and maximization of 
individual expected utility. 
 Third, B-rationality, or biological rationality; this is a concept of rationality 
associated with fitness maximization.  
 
 
4.2. Re-describing the debate 
 
Now, as mentioned above, I will use Kacelnik’s three definitions above in order to 
reinterpret the ongoing debate in what I take to be a much more illuminating way. By 
this, I mean not only that this reinterpretation will make each of the positions and 
arguments come out clearer, but also that it will allow me to detect and isolate an 
important flaw afflicting all but one of the above reviewed approaches. Thus, it will 
make it possible for me to suggest a way of adjudicating between them. Let me try to 
show you this.  
First, I will re-describe the main critical argument H&B or ER supporters put forth 
against the UR or OuC view. This re-description has the following aspect:  
Premise 1: UR and OuC theoreticians contend that humans are (approximately) 
E-rational.  
Premise 2: In order to be able to be, even approximately, E-rational, humans 
would need to be strongly P-rational.  
Premise 3: It is both psychologically false and computationally and, therefore, 
biologically, impossible for them to be strongly P-rational. 
Conclusion (by Modus Tollens): They cannot be E-rational either, not even 
approximately. 
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Second, I will re-describe the counter-argument UR or OuC supporters tend to 
advance against the criticism above according to the following Modus Ponens 
structure:   
Premise 1: Natural creatures are B-rational. 
Premise 2: In cognitively sophisticated natural creatures, B-rationality implies 
E-rationality. 
Premise 3: Humans are cognitively sophisticated natural creatures. 
Conclusion: Humans are E-rational. 
Third, I will render Stanovich’s argument in favor of BR as follows: 
Premise 1: In Nature B-rationality is pervasive. 
Premise 2: For non-human animals, being E-rational is easy. 
Premise 3: For humans, being E-rational is very hard. 
Premise 4: The worlds non-human animals live in and their cognitive systems 
are simple. 
Premise 5: Human worlds and human cognition are highly complex. 
Conclusion: Human cognitive P-complexity is the differentiating causal element 
that severs (in humans) the otherwise straightforward connection holding in Nature 
between B-rationality and E-rationality. 
The clarity introduced by this re-description of the arguments pays off. For 
instance, it is now easy to see that, if Stanovich is right, then the two following 
conclusions will hold. First, strong P-rationality cannot be a necessary condition for 
E-rationality (pace H&B and ER theorists); under this assumption, the cognitively 
inspired objections these theorists raise to Friedman’s or Anderson’s account of 
human rationality lose their point. Second, human P-complexity is a hindrance to 
human E-rationality though (pace UR and OuC theorists); therefore, critics of the 
evolutionary justification for the use of classical rational choice theory as a theory of 
human behavior will nevertheless be right, albeit for the wrong reasons. 
 
 
4.3. Is the “Third Way” a better way? 
 
The question, of course, is: Is Stanovich right? 
His argument is an inductive causal argument of the Millian sort (method of 
difference). It identifies human P-complexity as the differentiating causal element that 
accounts for the distinction allegedly observed between human and animal behavior 
regarding E-rationality. It thus assumes that, in the absence of this human peculiarity, 
E-rationality would follow, without further ado, from B-rationality.  
As we have seen above, that E-rationality follows straightforwardly from B-
rationality (in cognitively sophisticated creatures such as humans) is also a premise of 
the counter-argument by Modus Ponens UR or OuC supporters tend to put forth 
against Objection (B) (see section 2.2.).  
But is it really the case that the connection holding between B-rationality and E-
rationality is a straightforward one, either in humans or in non-human animals? This 
is the question that needs to be addressed in order to clarify whether or not the 







In order to try to find out an answer to this question, let me take a closer look at the 




5.1. Fitness Maximization 
 
As mentioned above, the concept of B-rationality is to be associated with the idea of 
fitness maximization. On the other hand, the idea of the fitness of a biological agent is 
associated with its degree of success relative to that of other biological agents in the 
same population. Fitness is thus a relative rather than an absolute notion. 
But what does “success” mean for a biological agent? And, whatever it means, 
how is it measured?  
The idea of “biological success” is clearly associated with survival and 
reproduction. However, complex organisms neither produce copies from themselves 
nor survive to themselves. As a matter of fact, what increases or decreases within a 
given population across long stretches of time is something else, namely, the number 
of copies of a gene relative to the total loci available for that gene in a given 
population. Thus, it is not organisms but genes that enjoy of more or less biological 
success. Assuming, pace Godfrey-Smith (Godfrey-Smith 2009), that we are allowed 
to import the agency idiom into evolutionary biology, genes are the biological agents 
(cp. Dawkins, R. 1976, 1982, Dennett, D. 1995). 
 
 
5.2. Inclusive Fitness 
 
Now, like everything else biological, the behavior of an individual organism is also, 
in some sense of this term, “guided” by the genes it carries. Thus, it should be 
possible, at least in principle, to analyze it as a derivative form of implementing 
fitness maximization. Kacelnik (2006) claims that this is precisely what theoretical 
population geneticists do.  
According to him, the idea there is to work out a function describing the behavior 
of particular biological organisms as the behavior of maximizing agents; again, in 
order for this to be possible, organisms need to be seen as extensions of their genes. 
What is then being maximized is what theoretical population geneticists call inclusive 
fitness. And this is still to be understood at the genetic level (i.e., relative success of 
particular genes within the gene pool) rather than at the individual level. 
However, putting into practice the guiding principle that B-rational individuals are 
supposed to exhibit a behavior maximizing their inclusive fitness is no easy task. 
Kacelnik lists a number of problems afflicting the use of this principle in empirical 
research. Some of them are the following. 
First, no organism can be expected to maximize inclusive fitness under all possible 
circumstances; thus, the concept is useful only when relativized to a limited number 
of them. 
Second, the detection that a strategy deployed by a particular organism is a form of 
maximizing its inclusive fitness must occur together with the identification of a 
typical situation that is or has been evolutionarily relevant for that organism; but this 
is easier said than done. 
Third, when evolutionary biologists engage in optimality research, what they are 
able to test in practice is which of different strategies a particular organism 
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consistently prefers. But, depending on the assumptions they make, any of the 
strategies being tested may be taken to be a proxy for a form of maximization of 
inclusive fitness. Thus, the inference that the one that seems to be chosen by the 
organism is the one that indeed maximizes its inclusive fitness under the 
circumstances being tested seems to be obviously circular. 
 
 
5.3. If B-Rational, then E-Rational? 
 
Regardless of how difficult it is to test B-rationality effectively, might nevertheless E-
rational behavior be derivable, at least in principle, from the constraints of B-
rationality? 
There is a sense in which it is possible to answer this question trivially in the 
affirmative. As Kacelnik put it (Kacelnik 2006, p. 99):  
 
if a subject is a consistent maximizer of inclusive fitness, then it is a consistent 
maximizer of something, and a consistent maximizer of anything is, by 
definition, E-rational.  
 
But, in spite of the trivial proposition above, does it really follow that the 
assumption that an organism maximizes inclusive fitness readily translates into the 
existence of some particular form of E-rational consistency among its revealed 
preferences?  
As a matter of fact, the answer seems to be no. In spite of Jensen, Call and 
Tomasello study and others like it, a look at the literature on animal rationality reveals 
that highly plausible suggestions have there been made on how to interpret in a B-
rational consistent way E-irrational (i.e., inconsistent) preference rankings which have 
also been conclusively observed (see, e.g., Schuck-Paim, C., Pompilio, L. and 
Kacelnik, A. 2004 or Houston, McNamara and Steer 2007a, 2007b). 
Truth be told, some of the very same authors mentioned above have also shown 
that with the introduction of suitable changes to the definition of either the relevant 
problem space or the utility function being used the exact same behavior could be 
reinterpreted in a way that would make preferences come out as E-consistent after all. 
The problem with implementing this sort of tinkering is, of course, that, once this is 
systematically done, E-rational interpretations of animal behavior begin to look more 
and more ad hoc and end up running the risk Kacelnik identified of becoming trivial.  
The upshot of this work seems then to be the following: the difficulties brought 
about by an E-rational interpretation of animal behavior are not essentially dissimilar 
to those brought about by more familiar attempts to produce E-rational interpretations 
of prima facie E-inconsistent human behavior. I.e., in this respect human and non-
human animals are not that different after all! 
 
 
6. There is no human exceptionality 
 
Introducing into this discussion the distinction between P-rationality, E-rationality 
and B-rationality along the lines suggested by Kacelnik has therefore proven to be 
valuable. It led us to the obtaining of the following important conclusion: it is not 
possible to straightforwardly derive a useful behavioral concept of E-rationality, both 
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for humans as well as for non-human animals, from the assumption that we are all 
subject to the constraints of B-rationality. 
However, that such a derivation should be straightforward and unproblematic for 
humans is precisely what is taken for granted by the second premise of the 
evolutionary counterargument put forth by the UR or OuC approaches.  
On the other hand, that such a straightforward and unproblematic derivation should 
be the default evolutionary assumption is something Stanovich’s Millian argument 
takes for granted. It is the realization that such a default seems not to apply to human 
behavior that motivates his search for the odd causal factor responsible for this human 
exceptionality.  
But, in reality, there simply is no human exceptionality in this regard. Birds, rats or 
chimpanzees don’t do better than humans in terms of rational agency!  
As a matter of fact, only under a limited and highly constrained set of 
circumstances does it seem to make sense to expect that B-rational and E-rational 
interpretations of human or non-human animal behavior will come out 
uncontroversially aligned. These are the circumstances under which maximization of 
individual expected utility may be taken to be an accurate proxy for inclusive fitness. 
 
 
7. Where do we stand? 
 
The evolutionary rationale claimed by the holders of the UR and OuC views as well 
as by Stanovich’s BR approach relies on a false premise. It is, therefore, not 
acceptable. 
In contrast, the H&B and the ER views seem to have clearly understood that 
assuming living creatures to be B-rational in no way legitimizes an analysis of their 
individual behaviors as being E-rational in any straightforward reading of this term.  
However, H&B theoreticians accept that classical rational choice approaches to E-
rationality define behavioral and cognitive rationality. Thus, they conclude that 
evolution made humans non-rational. This strikes me as wrong.  
As a matter of fact, this use of “rational” and “rationality” by H&B theoreticians 
seems to me to still fall prey to a top down view of Man. That is, a view according to 
which Man would ultimately be a sort of creature left somewhere halfway between 
“divine” rationality and “animal” nature – a being endowed with “indirect” rationality 
only, if I’m allowed to use here the expression once coined by J. Elster (1984). But 
what I think we need in this respect is to replace, once and for all, such a view of Man 
with a genuinely naturalistic, bottom up, view.   
This is exactly what, if I understand them correctly, ER theoreticians try to do. As 
already mentioned in 1.4. these researchers contend that the fast and frugal heuristics 
they claim to have identified in the human cognitive apparatus, rather than being 
simply dirty cognitive shortcuts, are frequently more robust ways of dealing with an 
uncertain and complex world than traditional optimization tools. To my view, if true, 
this contention changes substantially the nature of the philosophical debate 
concerning the understanding of human action.  
Thus, the ER approach seems to me to be the most promising. However, in most 
cases, we simply do not know yet how to connect animal or human behavior and 
cognition with what Dennett calls ‘strategic design’ (another word for B-rationality 
really) or with P-complexity (assuming that it is correct to associate P-rationality with 
procedural rationality). In fact, an approach such as this is more like a research 
program than like a full-blown view of the issue. 
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To conclude, it seems to me that this is an area of research in which we need to be 
humble – what the putative future empirical successes of ER or other similar research 
programs might entail for our understanding of the specificities of human or animal 
decision-making behavior is something we simply cannot anticipate by means of 
purely analytic reasoning. 
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